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Optical physical unclonable keys are currently considered to be rather promising candidates for
the development of entity authentication protocols, which offer security against both classical and
quantum adversaries. In this work we investigate the robustness of a continuous-variable protocol,
which relies on the scattering of coherent states of light from the key, against three different types of
intercept-resend emulation attacks. The performance of the protocol is analysed for a broad range
of physical parameters, and our results are compared to existing security bounds.
I. INTRODUCTION
Entity authentication (or identification) is a fundamen-
tal cryptographic task, which aims at providing a ver-
ifier with assurance about the identity of another en-
tity (a claimant) [1]. In order to offer high levels of
security, modern protocols combine in the framework
of a challenge-response mechanism, something that the
claimant possesses together with something that the
claimant knows [2]. For instance, a typical transaction
through an automatic-teller machine (verifier), relies on
the smart card that the user possesses, and a secret per-
sonal identification number (PIN). In each transaction,
the PIN is used to verify the user to the smart card, while
the latter is equipped with a chip which runs a publicly-
known algorithm, and involves a numerical secret key on
the card for which the verifier has a matching counter-
part i.e., either shares the secret key with the verifier or
holds the public key to the secret key. Verification of the
smart card is performed only if the PIN is correct, and
involves a number of random and independent numerical
challenges, for which the chip on the card computes a re-
sponse based on the implemented algorithm and the key.
The user is authenticated only if the responses agree with
the ones expected by the verifier. Attacks against con-
ventional smart cards and dynamic entity-authentication
protocols (EAP) are difficult but not impossible (e.g., see
[3–5] and references therein). More precisely, physical
invasive and non-invasive attacks, as well as software at-
tacks (e.g., viruses), constitute a severe threat as they
allow adversaries to extract the secret key from the card.
The necessity for entity-authentication protocols that are
robust against such types of attacks, has motivated the
development of physical unclonable functions (PUFs) [6–
8].
In general terms, a PUF is a cryptographic primitive
which converts an input challenge into an output re-
sponse, by means of a random physical unclonable key
(PUK). The randomness of the PUK is introduced explic-
itly or implicitly during its fabrication, and it is consid-
ered to be technologically hard to clone (hence the term
physical unclonable). The physical mechanism underpin-
ning the operation of a PUF, as well as the nature of the
challenge, depend on the nature of the PUK. Hence, one
can have electronic, optical, magnetic, biological PUFs,
etc. For a rather extensive list of PUFs and their clas-
sification the reader may refer to Ref. [8]. So far, elec-
tronic and optical PUFs appear to be the most prominent
classes of PUFs. An advantage of the former is that they
are compatible with existing technology and hardware,
but their robustness against various types of modelling
attacks does not seem to be as strong as expected (see
[9–12] and references therein). On the contrary, optical
PUFs are not fully compatible with existing technology,
but they offer many advantages relative to certain types
of electronic PUFs, including high complexity, security
against modeling attacks, and low cost [13].
Another advantage of optical PUFs is that they accept
quantum states of light as challenges, thereby enabling
for the design of EAPs whose security relies on funda-
mental principles of quantum physics [14, 15]. Typically,
the operation of such an EAP relies on a set of numeri-
cal challenge-response pairs (CRPs), which is generated
during the enrollment stage, and it is stored in a secure
database (see Fig. 1). There is also a publicly known
bijective map of the set of numerical challenges onto a
set of non-orthogonal quantum states of light. Whenever
the holder of the PUK has to authenticate himself in a
potentially unsecured verification set-up, his PUK under-
goes a verification procedure, where it is interrogated by
a random sequence of non-orthogonal quantum states of
light. Each state corresponds to a random and indepen-
dently chosen numerical challenge. The optical response
of the PUK to each quantum challenge is measured and
processed so that to obtain a numerical response. The
user is authenticated if the recorded numerical responses
do not deviate considerably from the expected numer-
ical responses listed in the set of CRPs. The precise
quantification of the deviations depends strongly on the
details of the protocol, and plays a pivotal role in its se-
curity. The main point is that even when an adversary
knows the set of numerical CRPs to be used for the ver-
ification of a PUK, the impersonation of the legitimate
user requires interaction of the adversary with the quan-
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2FIG. 1. General schematic representation of the main stages and the typical operations of an EAP with quantum readout of a
PUK. The enrollment stage is performed before the PUK is given to the user, and aims at the generation of a set of numerical
CRPs. In the verification stage, M  1 numerical challenges are chosen at random and independently from the available set of
CRPs for the particular PUK. Each numerical challenge is encoded independently in the quantum state of a laser pulse, which
is scattered from the PUK. The scattered light is measured and the outcome (response) is returned to the server. The PUK
is accepted or rejected based on a publicly known function, which quantifies the deviations of the recorded responses from the
expected ones.
tum states used for the interrogation of the PUK. This
is the only way for the adversary to estimate the numer-
ical challenges encoded on the quantum states, and to
send the corresponding responses to the verifier by look-
ing the estimated challenges up in the set of CRPs. How-
ever, fundamental theorems of quantum physics prevent
perfect discrimination between non-orthogonal quantum
states. As a result, the intervention of the adversary will
inevitably introduce errors, that will be detected by the
verifier, who can abort the authentication process.
In this context, we proposed recently a continuous-
variable quantum authentication of optical PUKs, which
relies on standard wavefront-shaping and homodyne-
detection techniques [15]. So far, the protocol has been
shown to offer cloning and collision resistance, while its
security against an emulation attack, in which an ad-
versary knows the challenge-response properties of the
PUK and he can access the challenges during the veri-
fication, has been analyzed in Ref. [16]. The analysis
of Ref. [16] is rather general and does not involve any
assumptions about the type of the state-discrimination
strategy adopted by the adversary. Hence, the natural
question arises whether the security bound obtained in
Ref. [16] can be attained by means of standard state-
discrimination techniques, which are within reach of cur-
rent or future technology. In the present work this ques-
tion is addressed for unambiguous state discrimination,
minimum-error discrimination and dual-homodyne de-
tection.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we discuss
briefly the EAP, while the intercept-resend attacks under
consideration are formulated in Sec. III. Our main results
and the robustness of the protocol are discussed in Sec.
IV. A summary with concluding remarks is given in Sec.
V.
II. AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
The EAP under consideration and the related veri-
fication set-up have been discussed in detail elsewhere
[15, 16], but for the sake of completeness we will give
3here a brief overview, focusing mainly on the aspects of
the EAP that are directly pertinent to the present work.
The interested reader may refer to Refs. [15, 16] for a
detailed description.
The main parts of the verification set-up are shown in
Fig. 2. A coherent probe is directed to the interrogation
chamber via a single-mode fiber (SMF A), and its wave-
front is shaped by a phase-only spatial light modulator
(SLM) thereby obtaining the quantum challenge, which
is focused on the PUK. The scattered light (speckle), is
collected by means of a polarizing beam-splitter and an
objective. One of the speckle grains is coupled to a prop-
erly positioned single-mode fiber (SMF B), which leads
to a standard homodyne detection (HD) set-up. SMF
B can be translated in a controlled manner at the out-
put plane so that to collect light from different speckle
grains (different target modes). The field in the mode
of the fiber is the response of the PUK to the particular
challenge, and in the HD set-up, the verifier measures
at random one of the two conjugate quadratures using a
strong local oscillator (LO) as reference.
The set-up operates in the diffusive limit [15, 16], and
the phase-mask of the SLM is optimized so that the in-
tensity of the scattered light in SMF B is maximized. The
optimization can be performed with standard algorithms
[17–19], and for a fixed set-up the optimal phase mask Φ
of the SLM, depends strongly on the PUK K and the cho-
sen target mode at the output s, while it is independent
of the details of the probe state [20, 21]. Moreover, hav-
ing obtained the optimal phase pattern, one can apply
a global phase shift to it, thereby determining the phase
of the field at the target mode relative to the LO, with-
out affecting the intensity [22]. Throughout this work we
assume that the probe is in a coherent state with fixed
mean number of photons µP, which is chosen at random
and independently from the symmetric set
SN :=
{
|αk〉 = |√µPeiϕk〉 : ϕk := 2pik
N
, k ∈ ZN
}
,(1)
where ZN = {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} and N  1. We associate
a randomly chosen phase shift with each possible value
of k, which is applied on the optimal phase pattern of
the SLM when the probe state |αk〉 is used. Hence, the
optimal phase pattern for the probe state |αk〉 becomes
Φk := Φ+ωk, where ωk denotes the applied global shift,
and is chosen at random and independently from a uni-
form distribution over finite set Ω. In the diffusive limit,
the action of the entire set-up on the input probe can be
represented by a linear transformation, which depends
on various parameters of the set-up, including the PUK,
and the (shifted) phase pattern of the SLM. The main
quantity of interest is the quantum mechanical expec-
tation value of the θ-quadrature of the electric field in
SMF B at the entrance of the HD set-up, which is given
by [15, 16]
〈Qˆ(θ)〉k =
√
2µR cos(χk − θ), (2)
where the mean number of photons µR that reach the HD
TABLE I. Illustration of a set of CRPs used for authentication
of a PUK. The set is identified by a unique identification
number (see discussion in Sec. V). The angles θ = 0 and pi/2
refer to the quadratures Xˆ and Yˆ of the field in SMF B at
the entrance of the HD set-up, respectively (see Fig. 2).
Identification Number
Challenge Response
k Phase mask θ = 0 θ = pi/2
0 Φ0 〈Xˆ〉0 〈Yˆ 〉0
1 Φ1 〈Xˆ〉1 〈Yˆ 〉1
2 Φ2 〈Xˆ〉2 〈Yˆ 〉2
...
...
...
N − 1 ΦN−1 〈Xˆ〉N−1 〈Yˆ 〉N−1
set-up is smaller than µP. Equation (2) encapsulates pos-
sible losses, and various other parameters pertaining to
the set-up and the applied wavefront-shaping technique.
For a fixed set-up with publicly-known parameters, µR
can be considered fixed and known, while the phase χk
is fully determined by the phase of the probe state ϕk,
the associated random phase shift ωk, and the PUK. For
θ = 0 and pi/2 one obtains the expectation values of the
conjugate quadratures of the field Xˆ and Yˆ , respectively.
There are two distinct stages in the EAP under con-
sideration i.e., the enrollment and the verification stages
(see Fig. 1). The enrollment stage takes place only once,
before a PUK is given to a user, it is performed by the
manufacturer, and aims at a reliable characterization of
the PUK with respect to its responses to a finite set of
challenges. The typical list of CRPs for the protocol un-
der consideration is given in Table I. We assume that
the enroller has all the resources needed for the reliable
estimation of the response Rk := {〈Xˆ〉k, 〈Yˆ 〉k} for each
challenge Ck := {k,Φk} [15]. After the enrollment stage,
the list of CRPs is stored in a database of a server, and
the PUK is given to a user.
The verification stage takes place each time the user
wishes to authenticate himself. He has to input the PUK
in a potentially unsecured verification set-up, which is
connected to the database over a secure and authenti-
cated classical channel. The server sends to the veri-
fier a sequence of M  1 challenges, chosen at random
from the available challenges, together with a sequence
of M angles (θ1, θ2, . . . , θM ) chosen at random and in-
dependently from a uniform distribution over {0, pi/2}.
The PUK is interrogated sequentially by the M chal-
lenges. In the jth challenge Ckj := {kj ,Φkj}, the veri-
fier measures the θj−quadrature of the field in SMF B.
Assuming very strong LO field, the outcome of the mea-
surement in the HD set-up follows a normal distribution
N (〈Qˆ(θj)〉kj , σ2), which is centered at the expectation
value of the measured quadrature and its standard de-
viation σ = 1/
√
2η, is determined by the detection ef-
ficiency η of the HD set-up. The outcomes from all of
the M measurements are returned to the server, over the
4FIG. 2. Schematic representation of the set-up for the EAP under consideration [15].
classical channel. Acceptance or rejection of the PUK is
decided upon the fraction of outcomes pin that fall within
an interval (bin) of width ∆, which is centered at the ex-
pectation value of the measured quadrature 〈Qˆ(θj)〉kj .
The theoretically expected probability for an outcome to
fall inside the interval is given by [16]
P
(0)
in = erf
(
∆¯
2
√
2
)
(3)
with ∆¯ = ∆/σ, which is independent of k and θ. For
sufficiently large values of M , one can ensure with high
confidence, that for the true PUK and in the absence of
cheating, the empirical probability pin will lie in an in-
terval of size 2ε around the theoretically expected prob-
ability P
(0)
in [15, 16]. Hence, the PUK is accepted if
|pin − P (0)in | < ε, and is rejected otherwise. As we will
see later on, the security parameter ε plays a central role
in the protocol, as it determines the regime of parameters
for which an attack can be detected by the verifier.
III. INTERCEPT-RESEND EMULATION
ATTACKS
The emulation attacks under consideration follow
closely the general theoretical framework of Ref. [16],
which is summarized in Fig. 3. We assume that the ad-
versary does not have access to the preparation of the
probe states, the actual PUK, the SLM, or the HD set-
up. However, he has obtained somehow a copy of all
the possible CRPs to be used in the authentication of
the PUK, and moreover he has obtained access to the
incoming and outgoing SMFs, without being detected.
Hence, if the adversary were able to estimate exactly the
probe state, he would be able to impersonate successfully
the holder of the PUK, by looking at the CRPs and by
sending to the HD set-up the expected response state.
However, quantum physics does not allow for perfect dis-
crimination between non-orthogonal quantum states, or
the measurement of non-communting quantum observ-
ables with arbitrary accuracy. As a result, it is inevitable
for the adversary’s intervention to introduce errors in the
HD performed by the verifier.
Given that the probe states in the M queries are cho-
sen at random and independently from a uniform distri-
bution over the set SN , from now on we can focus on one
of the queries and let |αk〉 denote the incoming probe
state. The adversary’s task is to obtain an estimate of
the integer k, which determines fully the challenge and
the expected response. To this end, he performs a mea-
surement on the incoming probe state, and based on the
outcome, the adversary makes an educated guess about
k, to be denoted by k˜. For the reasons discussed above,
this guess may or may not be equal to the actual k used
by the verifier, and thus the adversary’s intervention will
affect the probability with which the verifier obtains an
outcome in the expected bin. More precisely, instead of
Eq. (3) one has [16]
5FIG. 3. Schematic representation of the attack under consideration [16]. The adversary has a copy of the set of the numerical
CRPs, from which the challenges are chosen at random. He intercepts each one of the M incoming probe states, and measures
it in order to deduce the value of k (see table I). Based on the outcome of his measurement the adversary makes an educated
guess about k, say k˜, and he looks k˜ up in the set of CRPs in order to find the corresponding expected response Rk˜. Finally,
the adversary prepares and sends to the HD set-up of the verifier a quantum state that will induce statistics consistent with
Rk˜.
P (in|k, k˜, θ) = 1
2
erf
2
(
〈Qˆ(θ)〉k − 〈Qˆ(θ)〉k˜
)
+ ∆
2
√
2σ
− erf
2
(
〈Qˆ(θ)〉k − 〈Qˆ(θ)〉k˜
)
−∆
2
√
2σ
 , (4a)
where Qˆk(θ) and Qˆk˜(θ) denote the θ−quadratures of the
response field, when the adversary deduces the correct
and the wrong value of k. Both of them are given by Eq.
(2) for k and k˜, respectively.
Given that the verifier samples from both quadratures
at random and independently, after M queries the verifier
will obtain an estimate of the average probability [16]
Pin =
N−1∑
k=0
N−1∑
k˜=0
∑
θ∈{0,pi/2}
P (in, k, k˜, θ) = (1− Perr)P (0)in +
1
2N
∑
k
∑
k˜ 6=k
P (k˜|k)
∑
θ=0,pi/2
P (in|k, k˜, θ), (4b)
where P (in|k, k˜, θ) is given by Eq. (4a) and
Perr :=
∑
k
P (k, k˜ 6= k) = 1− 1
N
∑
k
P (k˜ = k|k) (5)
is the probability for the adversary to make an error in
his estimation of k.
The probability Pin takes into account all of the events
irrespective of whether the adversary deduced the cor-
rect value of k or not. In the second equality of Eq. (4b)
we have taken into account the uniform distribution of k
over ZN and of θ over {0, pi/2}. Moreover, we have used
the fact that the state of the probe and the outcome of
the adversary are independent of the quadrature to be
measured by the verifier. A straightforward calculation
[16] shows that Pin is always smaller than the correspond-
ing expression in the absence of cheating [which is given
by Eq. (3)], and the difference
D := P
(0)
in − Pin, (6a)
basically quantifies the adversary’s intervention. The
adversary’s intervention will be detected by the verifier
when the observed deviations from P
(0)
in exceed the sta-
tistical deviations i.e., when
D > 2ε. (6b)
As mentioned above, the security threshold 2ε is deter-
mined by the sample size M in the verification stage
6while, in general, the exact values of Perr, Pin, and D,
depend on the measurement applied by the adversary.
However, working along the lines of Ref. [16] one readily
obtains a lower bound on Perr, which in turn yields the
following lower bound on D
D ≥ P (low)err
[
P 0in − Pmax(in|error)
]
:= Dlow, (7)
where Pmax(in|error) := maxk,k˜
{
P (in|k, k˜)
}
k˜ 6=k
. This
bound is expected to hold irrespective of the adversary’s
measurement, and its dependence on various parameters
of the protocol has been discussed in detail elsewhere [16].
In particular, it has been shown that for any given com-
bination of parameters {ε,∆, µP , µR}, the secure opera-
tion region for the protocol becomes wider for increasing
η. Typical HD set-ups have η > 0.5, and η = 0.5 can
be considered as the worst-case scenario for the security
of the protocol. The size of the bin width ∆ relative to
the detection efficiency is a free parameter that can be
chosen at will, so that to optimize the performance of the
protocol. For any given combination of {ε, η, µP , µR} it
has been shown that the optimal value is ∆ ' 2σ. Hence,
although our simulations have been extended to various
combinations of η and ∆, throughout the present work
we focus on numerical results for η = 0.5 and ∆ = 2σ. To
facilitate the analysis of our results for the three different
attacks, in Fig. 4 we plot the lower bound Dlow as a func-
tion of N , for different values µP and µR. As explained
in Ref. [16], the depicted asymmetric bell-shape stems
from the fact that Dlow is a product of two functions
of N with opposite monotonicity [see Eq. (7)]. More
precisely, P
(low)
err increases with increasing N approach-
ing a non-zero value determined by the classical limit,
while P
(0)
in − Pmax(in|error) decreases with increasing N ,
approaching zero for large values of N . A crucial parame-
ter for the security of the protocol is the mean number of
photons that reach the HD set-up. The larger µR is for a
fixed N , the easier the verifier can discriminate between
〈Qˆk(θ)〉 and 〈Qˆk˜ 6=k(θ)〉. In general, µR can be increased
in two different ways: (i) increasing µP for fixed losses
in the set-up; (ii) improving the set-up, thereby reduc-
ing the losses. Figures 4(a) and 4(b), refer to these two
cases, and in both of them we see that for a given ε the
secure region gets wider with increasing µR, which is in
agreement with the aforementioned role of µR in the dis-
crimination of different responses.
A. Dual Homodyne-detection Attack
In a dual homodyne-detection attack (DHA), for each
probe the adversary performs a joint measurement of
the non-commuting observables {Xˆk, Yˆk}, by means of
an eight-port interferometric set-up [23, 24], thereby ob-
taining a bivariate random variable (x, y), which follows
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FIG. 4. The lower bound Dlow, as a function of the number
of different probe states N , for various values of µP but fixed
ratio µR/µP (a); and various values of µR for fixed µP (b).
The vertical dashed line marks the security threshold 2ε =
15 × 10−4, and the protocol is secure against any intercept-
resend attack for Dlow > 2ε.
the two-dimensional normal distribution
P
(DH)
k (x, y) =
1
2pi
exp
−
[
x− 〈XˆA〉k
]2
+
[
y − 〈YˆA〉k
]2
2

(8a)
where 〈XˆA〉k and 〈YˆA〉k refer to the expectation values
of the quadratures of the electric field in SMF A, when
the field is in state |αk〉. Assuming negligible losses in
SMF A and in the set-up of the adversary we have
〈XˆA〉k = 〈αk| XˆA |αk〉 =
√
2µP cos(ϕk),
〈YˆA〉k = 〈αk| YˆA |αk〉 =
√
2µP sin(ϕk). (8b)
Moreover, in Eq. (8a) we have assumed perfect detection
efficiency for the adversary (σDH = 1), which is the worst-
case scenario for the security of the protocol. Hence,
when the efficiency in the HD set-up of the verifier is η ≥
0.5 we have σ ≤ σDH. This suggests that, for either of the
quadratures, the adversary samples from a distribution,
7n=0 k=0
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FIG. 5. Discretization of the phase space for N = 8. The
segment for the actual probe state k = 0 (green) and all other
possible probe states (blue) are shown. The coloring displays
the probabilities PDH(k˜|k = 0) for k˜ = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 (dark:
high probability).
which is at least as broad as the distribution sampled by
the verifier.
To proceed further, we have to define a strategy for the
adversary to make an educated guess for the probe stare
|αk〉, given the random outcome of the dual-homodyne
detection (x, y). Recall here that the adversary has ob-
tained a copy of the list of the CRPs for the particular
PUK, which allows him to discretize the phase space as
shown in Fig. 5 . The k-th sector corresponds to the
probe state |αk〉. It is centered at {〈XˆA〉k, 〈YˆA〉k}, and
its angular extension is from ϕk − pi/N to ϕk + pi/N ,
while its radius ρ extends from 0 to ±∞. So, when the
random outcome (x, y) falls in the k˜-th sector, the adver-
sary concludes that the probe state was |αk˜〉, and thus
the response expected by the verifier is Rk˜. Working in
polar coordinates, the probability for the random out-
come (x, y) to fall within the k˜-th sector given that the
probe state was |αk〉 is given by the integral
P (DH)(k˜|k) = 1
2pi
∫ ϕ
k˜
+ piN
ϕ
k˜
− piN
dγ
∫ ∞
0
ρ exp
[
−ρ
2 + 2µP −
√
8µPρ cos(γ − ϕk)
2
]
dρ, (9)
where we have set x = ρ cos(γ), y = ρ sin(γ), and used
Eqs. (8). Setting γ′ = γ−ϕk one can readily confirm that
this probability depends only on the difference n := (k˜−
k) mod N . Therefore, the probability for the adversary
to deduce the wrong probe state is given by
P (DH)err = 1−
N−1∑
k=0
p(k)PDH(k˜ = k|k) = 1− PDH(k˜ = k|k).
(10)
After the measurement, the adversary prepares and
sends to the verifier a coherent state |βk˜〉, which is con-
sistent with his educated guess about the probe state,
and will induce the expected statistics at the HD set-up
of the verifier. The average probability P
(DH)
in for the
state |βk˜〉 to result in an outcome within the expected
bin is given by Eq. (4b), after substituting P (k˜|k) by
P (DH)(k˜|k), which is given by Eq. (9). Hence, the adver-
sary’s intervention will introduce errors in the estimate
to be obtained by the verifier, which are quantified by
the difference
D(DH) := P
(0)
in − P (DH)in = P (DH)err
P (0)in − 1P (DH)err
 1
2N
∑
k
∑
k˜ 6=k
P (DH)(k˜|k)
∑
θ=0,pi/2
P (in|k, k˜, θ)
 . (11)
The term inside the brackets is the joint probability
for the adversary to deduce the wrong value for k, and
the outcome of the HD of the verifier to fall within the
expected bin.
B. Unambiguous State-Discrimination Attack
Assume now that the adversary applies an ideal unam-
biguous discrimination (UD) measurement to each probe,
8in order to deduce which of the N possible coherent states
is used by the verifier [25–28]. The adversary will either
obtain a conclusive result, or an inconclusive result. In
the former case, he learns the actual state of the probe
with certainty, whereas in the latter he learns nothing
about the incoming state, which is destroyed by the mea-
surement, and additional measurement on it will not pro-
vide any useful information. Given that the adversary
has the list of CRPs, a conclusive result implies that the
adversary knows precisely the response expected by the
verifier, whereas in the case of an inconclusive result, all
of the possible responses are equally probable.
The minimum probability for an inconclusive result is
[25]
Pinc = 1−N ·minr∈ZN
 1
N
N−1∑
j=0
e−i2pijr/N · e|α|2(ei2pij/N−1)
 ,(12)
which is independent of the value of k i.e., independent of
the probe state. In the case of a conclusive outcome the
adversary will prepare and send a coherent state, which
will induce the expected statistics at the HD set-up of
the verifier. Hence, the probability for the verifier to get
a result inside the bin, given that the adversary obtained
a conclusive outcome, is equal to P
(0)
in [see Eq. (3)]. On
the contrary, in the case of an inconclusive result, the
adversary has no information on the probe state or on the
response expected by the verifier. Given that the verifier
expects a response state for each probe, the adversary has
to send a state to the HD set-up of the verifier. Hence,
we assume that in the case of an inconclusive outcome,
the adversary has to choose at random one of the N
equally probable responses, and send a coherent state
|βk˜〉 that will induce the corresponding statistics at the
HD set-up of the verifier. This choice is independent of
the probe state, and thus the conditional probability for
the random choice to yield k˜, given an inconclusive result
on the input state |αk〉 is given by
P (UD)(k˜|inc, k) = P (UD)(k˜) = 1
N
. (13)
Using this equation, the overall error probability reads
P (UD)err = Pinc
N − 1
N
. (14)
Using the fact that a conclusive outcome always yields
the correct value of k, while the occurrence of a conclusive
or inconclusive result is independent of k, one readily
obtains
P (UD)(k˜ 6= k|k) = Pinc
N
. (15)
The average probability for the verifier to get an out-
come inside the expected bin after an unambiguous-state-
discrimination attack (UDA) is given by Eqs. (4), after
replacing P (k˜|k) by Eq. (15) and Perr by P (UD)err . Accord-
ingly, the deviations that will be observed by the verifier
are quantified by the difference
D(UD) = P (UD)err
P (0)in − 1P (UD)err
 1
2N
∑
k
∑
k˜ 6=k
P (UD)(k˜|k)
∑
θ=0,pi/2
P (in|k, k˜, θ)
 . (16)
where P (in|k, k˜, θ) is given by Eq. (4a).
C. Minimum-error State Discrimination Attack
The third attack we consider relies on a minimum-error
state-discrimination measurement [29, 30]. Each of the
possible outcomes k˜ ∈ {0, 1, . . . N − 1} , is character-
ized by a corresponding probability operator measure el-
ement Πˆk˜, also referred to as a positive operator-valued
measure. The probability for the adversary to obtain
outcome k˜, given that the probe state |αk〉 was used, is
P (SR)(k˜|k) = Tr
(
ρˆkΠ̂k˜
)
, (17)
where ρˆk := |αk〉 〈αk|. When the adversary obtains the
outcome k˜, he concludes that the probe was also in state
|αk˜〉, and thus the response expected by the verifier is
Rk˜ = {〈Xˆk˜〉, 〈Yˆk˜〉}.
Given that the authentication scheme works with the
symmetric set of states SN , the optimal measurement
that minimizes the error probability is the square-root
measurement [29, 30], where the operator Π̂k is given by
Π̂k :=
1
N
ρˆ−
1
2 ρˆkρˆ
− 12 , (18)
with ρˆ :=
∑
k ρˆk/N . The average probability for the
adversary to deduce the wrong probe state is given by
P (SR)err =
1
N
N−1∑
k=0
∑
k˜ 6=k
P (SR)(k˜|k) = 1− 1
N
N−1∑
k=0
Tr
(
ρˆkΠˆk
)
.
(19)
As in the previous attacks, given the outcome k˜, the
adversary prepares and sends to the verifier a coherent
state that will induce statistics compatible with the re-
sponse Rk˜. The probability P
(SR)
in for the verifier to ob-
tain an outcome within the expected bin is given by Eqs.
9(4), after replacing P (k˜|k) by P (SR)(k˜|k), which is given
by Eqs. (17) and (18). Hence, the adversary’s inter-
vention will introduce errors in the estimate to be ob-
tained by the verifier, which are quantified by the differ-
ence D(SR) := P
(0)
in − P (SR)in . Using Eq. (4b) we have for
the square-root-measurement attack (SRA)
D(SR) = P (SR)err
P (0)in − 1P (SR)err
 1
2N
∑
k
∑
k˜ 6=k
P (SR)(k˜|k)
∑
θ=0,pi/2
P (in|k, k˜, θ)
 . (20)
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We have performed extensive simulations on the afore-
mentioned three different types of intercept-resend at-
tacks, and in this section we discuss our main findings
on the security of the proposed protocol. As discussed
in Sec. III, the protocol is secure when the difference of
probabilities (6a) exceeds the security threshold 2ε, at-
tained by sampling. Hence, for a given value of ε, the
main quantity of interest for the security of the protocol
is the difference of probabilities D, which for the three
different attacks is given in Eqs. (11), (16) and (20). A
lower bound on D has been obtained in Ref. [16], through
the Holevo bound and Fano’s inequality, and it is given
in Eq. (7). In all of the cases, we see that D is of the
form D = Perr[P
(0)
in − P (in|error)], where Perr is the er-
ror probability in each case, P
(0)
in is the probability for
the verifier to obtain an outcome inside the bin in the
absence of any attack [see Eq. (3)], and P (in|error) is
the corresponding probability in the presence of the at-
tack, and given that the adversary has made in error in
deducing the right probe state.
Both of Perr and P (in|error) depend on the attack un-
der consideration. Hence, it is instructive to look at them
separately, in comparison with the corresponding quan-
tities determining the lower bound in Eq. (7), before we
discuss the dependence of D on the various parameters of
the protocol. In Fig. 6(a) we plot the probability for the
adversary to deduce the wrong probe state, as a function
of the number of different probe states N used in the
protocol, and for fixed mean number of photons in the
probe. The error probabilities for the three attacks are
given by Eqs. (10), (14), and (19), while for the sake of
comparison, we also show the lower bound on the error
probability P
(low)
err (blue curve). In all of the cases we
find a monotonic increase of the error probability with
N . For N < 50, the error probabilities for all of the
three attacks are very close to the lower bound, and they
start deviating from it as we increase N . The deviation is
slower in the case of the square-root-measurement attack
(green curve), which is practically indistinguishable from
the lower bound (blue curve) up to N ' 60, and it re-
mains close to it for values of N up to about 100. The er-
ror probability for the unambiguous-state-discrimination
attack exhibits the fastest increase, and P
(UD)
err ' 1 for
N ' 100 (gray curve). The dual-homodyne-detection at-
tack stands between the other two attacks. The same
behavior has been found for other values of µP, and the
main difference is that the error probability increases
slower with N , for increasing values of µP.
Let us turn now to the other quantity of interest,
namely the conditional probability P (in|error) relative
to P
(0)
in . As depicted in Fig. 6(b), for either of the three
attacks under consideration P (in|error) increases with N ,
approaching an asymptotic value which is below P
(0)
in as
well as below the asymptotic value of Perr for the same
attack [compare to Fig. 6(a)]. This is in contrast to
the behavior of Pmax(in|error) (blue curve), which ap-
proaches P
(0)
in (dashed vertical line) as we increase N .
Based on these findings, we expect the lower bound
Dlow to approach zero as we increaseN (which is in accor-
dance with Fig. 4), whereas for all of the three attacks, D
is expected to approach a non-zero value as we increase
N . Indeed, as shown in Fig. 7, this is confirmed by our
simulations. As a result, for a given security threshold ε
and fixed losses (i.e., fixed ratio µR/µP), there is a very
broad regime of values for N and µP where D exceeds
2ε and the protocol is secure against all of the three at-
tacks. The secure regime is considerably broader than
the one predicted by the lower bound (compare to Fig.
4). The strongest attack seems to be the square-root-
measurement attack. Consider, for instance, the case of
2ε = 15 × 10−4. We have D(SR) > 2ε for N > 100 [see
Fig. 7(e)], whereas for the other two attacks we find
D(DH) > 2ε for N > 45 [see Fig. 7(a)], D(UD) > 2ε for
N > 60 [see Fig. 7(c)]. By contrast to the lower bound
Dlow [see Fig. 4(a)], where there is an upper bound on
the values of N for which the condition Dlow > 2ε is sat-
isfied, we do not find any such bound for either of the
three attacks we have considered in this work. Moreover,
for all the three attacks we find that the rise of D with N
gets slower as we increase µP, which is in agreement with
the analogous behavior obtained for the error probability.
Keeping the mean number of photons µP in the probe
constant, and increasing the losses in the set-up (i.e., de-
creasing the mean number of photons that reach the HD
set-up relative to µP), we find that lower security thresh-
olds have to be attained by the verifier, so that to ensure
the security of the protocol against both of the dual-
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FIG. 6. (a) Probability for the adversary to deduce the wrong probe state in the case of dual-homodyne-detection attack (red
curve, DHA), square-root-measurement attack (green curve, SRA) and unambiguous-state-discrimination attack (gray curve,
UDA), as a function of the number of different probe states N . The lower bound is also shown (blue curve). (b) Conditional
probability P (in|error) for the verifier to obtain a result inside the expected bin given that the adversary inferred the wrong
probe state, as function of N and for different attacks. The maximum value Pmax(in|error) is also shown (blue curve), and all
of the probabilities are compared to the probability P 0in in the absence of an attack (dashed vertical line).
homodyne-detection and the square-root-measurement
attack. For example, we see that the protocol is not se-
cure against the square-root-measurement attack when
2ε = 4 × 10−4 and µP = 600, with µR = 0.05µP, but
it is secure against the dual-homodyne-detection attack
if N > 50 [see Figs. 7(f) and (b), respectively]. More-
over, for the particular chosen value of 2ε, we find that
the protocol becomes secure against both of these at-
tacks if µR = 0.1µP and N > 110. Security against the
two attacks when the losses in the set-up are such that
µR = 0.05µP, requires N ≥ 110 and sufficiently large
sample size M so that 2ε . 3×10−4. By contrast, we find
small changes in the variation of D(UD) with N , which
suggests that the unambiguous-state-discrimination at-
tack is weaker than the other two.
V. DISCUSSION
In this work we have analysed the seurity of the verifi-
cation stage in the EAP of Ref. [15] against three specific
intercept-resend emulation attacks. Our results suggest
that the protocol is secure against all of the attacks si-
multaneosuly for a broad range of values for the rele-
vant parameters of the protocol. Moreover, the perfor-
mance of all of these attacks has been compared to the
lower security bound obtained in Ref. [16], by means of
the Fano’s inequality and the Holevo bound. None of
the attacks considered here saturates the expected lower
bound. Hence, the existence as well as the details of the
attack that will saturate the lower security bound, remain
a subject of future work. One may wonder, whether the
displaced-photon counting [31] can achieve this goal. We
believe that this is not the case for a number of reasons.
Firstly, the probability for the adversary to deduce the
wrong state is expected to be higher for the displaced-
photon counting, than for the square-root measurement
discussed here. This is because our protocol relies on
a set of symmetric states, and it is well-known that the
square-root measurement minimizes the probability of er-
ror in this case [29, 30]. Higher error probability means
that it is easier for the verifier to detect the adversary’s
intervention. Secondly, the displaced-photon counting
has been shown to outperform the dual-homodyne mea-
surement in phase estimation, only for phases in a nar-
row region around ϕ = 0 [31]. Outside this region, the
dual-homodyne measurement outperforms by the same
amount the displaced-photon counting. In our protocol,
the random phase of a probe state lies in the interval
[0, 2pi), and all of the possible values are equally proba-
ble. As a result, on the average, the performance of the
displaced-photon counting is expected to be very close
to the performance of the dual-homodyne detection dis-
cussed here.
As far as experimental realisations of the present at-
tacks are concerned, the dual-homodyne-detection attack
can be implemented with current technology [32]. On the
contrary, to the best of our knowledge, the experimental
realization of the unambiguous-state-discrimination at-
tack and of the square-root measurement attack for arbi-
trary number of symmetric coherent states is not known.
A rather simple linear-optics implementation of unam-
biguous state-discrimination has been proposed in Ref.
[33], which is far from optimal for large values of N .
The present work focuses on the verification of a PUK,
assuming that the user has already been verified success-
fully to the PUK (see Sec. I). In analogy to conventional
smart cards, the verification of the user to the PUK can
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FIG. 7. Difference of probabilities D = P 0in − Pin as a function of the total number of different probe states N , for the dual-
homodyne-detection attack (a,b); the unambiguous-state-discrimination attack (c,d); and the square-root-measurement attack.
The horizontal dashed lines mark the security threshold 2ε = 15×10−4 (l.h.s) and 2ε = 4×10−4 (r.h.s). The protocol is secure
against a specific type of intercept-resend attack when the corresponding value of D exceeds 2ε.
be achieved through a PIN which is known to the le-
gitimate owner of the PUK. This is necessary for any
EAP, so that to prevent impersonation in case the PUK
is stolen. When the PUK is given to a legitimate user
it is accompanied by the PIN, which has been generated
during the enrollment stage, and it is not shown in Fig.
1. One way to combine an optical PUK with a PIN is
to exploit the techniques of Refs. [6, 34]. For example,
one can assume that the PUK is illuminated by classical
light, whose wavefront has been modified by a random
SLM phase mask Ψ [The pattern Ψ should not be con-
fused with the optimal phase masks Φ (and Φk), which
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are used for the verification of the PUK as discussed in
the previous sections of the present work. The former is
a totally random phase mask, whereas the latter are op-
timized with respect to a particular target mode at the
output.]. The response of the PUK to classical light with
random wavefront Ψ is a random speckle, which can be
processed with standard algorithms to result in a numer-
ical random binary string, say w = wid||wpin [34]. The
last n bits of w, denoted by wpin, define the n−bit PIN,
whereas the first partwid serves as an identification num-
ber for the list of CRPs to be used for the authentication
of the particular PUK (see table I). In this way, the list
of CRPs, the PUK and the PIN are linked through a
random phase mask, which is known only to the verifier,
as well as to the authority that issues and distributes the
PUKs.
In analogy to conventional smart cards, at the begin-
ning of the verification stage the user types in his PIN,
and inserts his PUK to the verifier’s set-up. The verifier
imprints the pattern Ψ on the wavefront of the incoming
light by means of his SLM, and the speckle of the scat-
tered light is processed to yield the classical string w. If
the last n bits of w agree with the PIN of the user, the
verifier proceeds to the verification of the PUK, otherwise
the authentication is aborted immediately. For the veri-
fication stage, the verifier sends to the server the key wid
over a secure and authenticated classical channel, and
the server returns a sequence of M challenges chosen at
random from the list of CRPs with identification number
equal towid. The verification stage proceeds as discussed
in Sec. II, as well as in Refs. [15, 16]. If an adversary has
stolen the PUK, he cannot impersonate the legitimate
owner without knowledge of the PIN, while the probabil-
ity for an adversary to guess correctly the n−bit PIN is
negligible. Moreover, the random string w is essentially
the output of a physical one-way function with input Ψ,
while the probability for the jth bit of w to be 0 or 1,
is expected to be approximately equal to 0.5 [6, 34]. As
a result, it is hard for an adversary to infer the random
pattern Ψ, or the PIN from wid. It is worth emphasizing
that one can incorporate both of the validation of the
PIN and the verification of the PUK in the set-up of Fig.
2, after a few amendments. More precisely, by adding
a half-wave plate and an additional PBS at the output,
one can select to image the speckle onto a camera (for the
PIN validation), or onto the optical plane where SMF B
is positioned (for the PUK verification) [20, 21]. Hence,
the set-up can operate in two different modes. Note also
that in the ”PIN-validation” mode, intense probe has to
be used so that to obtain a clear speckle, whereas in the
”PUK-verification” mode the set-up has to operate with
parameters that are dictated by the present as well as
previous security analyses. Finally, we cannot exclude
alternative ways to link an optical PUK to a PIN e.g.,
through the control of laser parameters (such as the angle
of incidence and the wavelength) [6], and/or the control
of the target mode at the output [35].
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